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From Survival to Revival: 
The Riga Summit 2015 and the revised ENP 
Suzana Carp and Tobias Schumacher 
With the European Parliament’s July 
report on the revision of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) calling on 
the Commission to ‘go back to basics’, 
this article argues that such a move 
would be counter-productive and that 
instead, the ENP needs to move towards 
the future and break away with the 
historical elusiveness of this overarching 
policy. The Riga Summit serves as an 
illustration of what will not suffice if the 
EU is to strengthen or even maintain its 
role in its neighbourhoods. The revision 
of the ENP is described as 3Dimensional 
process which needs to yield a concrete 
and forward-looking new ENP. The 
recommendations put forth herein map 
out what a truly revised ENP would 
entail. 
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the event, meant to reconfirm the non-
expansionary and non-coercive approach of 
the EU towards its Eastern partners, the 
silence following the summit has been, in fact, 
transforming ‘Riga’ into the ‘non-event’ that 
others predicted and, consequently, cautioned 
against.1  
 
Picking up on this development, this policy 
brief takes issue with the current revision 
process of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) and argues that the Riga 
Summit, labeled as a survival summit2, can 
serve, in retrospect, to inform the current 
revision process of the potential pitfalls that 
may emerge, in order to diminish the risk that 
the ENP review is carried out for the sake of 
the revision itself, which would ultimately 
result in a non-revised policy.  
 
Thus, ironically, the Riga Summit has the 
potential to become, in retrospect, the ‘Revival 
Summit’ for the entire ENP, due to its role in 
drawing the alarm on the low ambition level 
which the revised ENP may result in. This 
policy brief aims at providing clear 
recommendations as to how the revision 
process of the ENP can avoid falling into the 
trap of generating yet another non-revised 
policy.  
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On 21-22 May 2015, the EU and its six 
Eastern neighbors gathered in Riga for the 
fourth Eastern Partnership (EaP) Summit. In 
contrast to the previous EaP Summit, the 
Vilnius Summit of November 2013, this year's 
summit enjoyed much less visibility and much 
less public attention. While this may be a 
consequence of the intended low-key profile of 
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REVISING THE REVISED  
The first ENP revision process took place 
over the course of the second half of 2010 and 
the first months of 2011 and resulted in the 
overly ambitious ‘A new response to a 
changing neighbourhood’, already suggesting 
that ENP revisions are processes of a responsive 
nature.  
 
Thus, expectations that the ongoing revision 
will produce a meaningful response to current 
challenges do exist, in particular among some 
of the EU’s neighbours, and the EU can’t 
afford to put forth anything short of what it 
has promised to design - more specifically, a 
new ENP. Yet, policy revision is always 
context-dependent. Thus, in order to 
understand what the revision of the ENP aims 
to achieve, the question of timing must be 
reckoned with a priori.  
 
The ENP resurfaced in the international 
spotlight due to the rapidly changing 
geopolitical circumstances and growing 
instability in the EU’s neighborhoods. 
However, while the changing environment at 
the EU’s borders is often invoked as the sole 
cause of the current revision process, it would 
be misleading to ignore intra-EU dynamics: 
with a new cabinet of commissioners in office 
and a five year term ahead, the European 
Commission has embarked upon ambitious 
projects and multi-facetted plans for action or 
reforms. Thus, there are several overlapping 
motives for a revision of the ENP, including 
the non-negligible fact that Commission 
President Juncker, after having declared the 
review of the ENP a major objective of his 
Commission, is under pressure to deliver 
sooner rather than later.  
 
A credible policy can only be one whose 
design has not been altered for the sake of 
change and which does not sideline, nor 
compromise on any of its goals, for the mere 
purpose of disguising de facto inertia. Thus, a 
revised ENP has to be informed by the 
shortcomings of the current approach, by the 
expectations and views of the partners 
concerned and last, but not least, it must lay 
out a clear vision for future relations between 
the EU and all of its neighbors and partners. 
 
THE CURRENT ENP REVISION 
PROCESS: A 3-DIMENSIONAL DYNAMIC 
The first half of 2015 has been a crucial period 
in the evolution of the ENP, as three dynamics 
promising to directly contribute to the current 
ENP revision process were taking place 
simultaneously, albeit not in a correlated 
fashion.  
 
1. At the center of the revision is the recently 
concluded consultation process, initiated 
and carried out by the Commission and the 
EEAS, drawing also on the input from civil 
society actors from both within the EU 
and eastern and southern neighborhood 
countries. The channeling of national 
position papers by the Member States into 
this process is to be welcomed as it signals 
their general willingness to engage with the 
revision as such. At the same time, 
however, it contributes to perpetuating the 
power inequality between civil society 
actors in ENP partner countries and EU 
Member States’ governments which have 
their staff and representatives in the EEAS 
and thus greater leverage to influence the 
course of action; 
 
2. A second dynamic which has been 
complementing the open consultation have 
been the deliberations in the European 
Parliament’s AFET Committee as regards 
the Report on the review of the ENP, 
which has been voted in the EP plenary 
during July 2015 and which represents the 
EP’s position on the revised ENP. This 
position remains deeply problematic as it 
calls for the "ENP to go back to basics", 
without, however, taking into account the 
in-built problems in the very basics of the 
ENP; 
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3. Thirdly, on the ministerial level, the Riga 
Summit and the Barcelona Informal 
Ministerial meeting with the southern ENP 
partners of 13 April 2015 both served as 
platforms to discuss expectations of the 
new ENP and as a means for the EU to 
collect input from its governmental 
partners. However, as the Riga Summit is, 
from a technical point of view, separate 
from the ENP revision process, as it took 
place under the auspices of the EaP 
framework and would have taken place 
regardless of the revision process. In 
contrast, the Barcelona meeting was 
specifically organized with a view to gather 
input for the revision of the ENP. Thus, 
by virtue of the absence of an informal 
ministerial meeting, similar in nature to 
that which took place in Barcelona, an 
official EaP summit, the Riga Summit, was 
perceived as a surrogate ministerial meeting 
destined to generate feedback.  
 
The Joint Declaration emerging from the Riga 
Summit is remarkable for the fact that in each 
of the articles in the declaration the EU is 
either ‘reconfirming’, ‘reaffirming’, ‘restating’ 
or ‘reiterating’ in different ways its previous 
commitments. This could be interpreted as 
another sign of the unbroken prevalence of the 
status quo and thus of the ongoing stagnation 
in EU-neighbourhood relations. Yet, for the 
EU to live up to the promise that the 
consultation process will lead to a truly new 
ENP, Riga has to be regarded as a powerful 
reminder of what will not suffice.  
 
Whatever form and shape the re-revised ENP 
will adopt, the emerging framework will, in this 
context, end up filling the gaps left empty at 
Riga. With such an ambitious, 3-D revision, 
destined to revive the ENP, the response 
generated needs to put forth new ways of 
doing things, without discontinuing 
established, though allegedly more technical-
minded working practices.  
‘DO’S’ AND ‘DON'TS’ FOR A NEW ENP3 
1. Take real i t i es  on the ground for  what 
they are  
The new ENP must properly engage with the 
realities on the ground. Even though support 
for further cooperation and integration into the 
EU is considerably high in several ENP 
partner countries a closer and more 
differentiated look at opinion polls 
demonstrates a different and more sobering 
picture. For example, according to the fifth and 
sixth wave of EU Neighbourhood Barometers 
of 2014, 56% of respondents in the eastern 
neighbourhood have a negative or neutral 
image of the EU whereas in the southern 
neighbourhood only 38% hold a positive view 
of the EU. This is important and cannot be 
neglected as perceptions condition and 
potentially constrain governmental partners’ 
legitimacy and their domestic room for 
manoeuvre to engage in supposedly wide-
ranging ENP-induced reforms. The EU must 
become more visible in its neighbourhood and 
work on generating more tangible benefits for 
the partner neighbouring societies. 
 
2. Don’t  go ‘back to basi cs ’  
The alleged need to go ‘back to basics’ that the 
EP report on the revision of the ENP calls for, 
draws heavily on the enlargement logic. 
However, this is both misleading and 
problematic. On one hand, the ‘basics’ back in 
2002 and early 2003 when ‘Wider Europe’ was 
concocted related to a neighbourhood that 
looked rather different than today’s. Also, the 
‘basics’ were rooted in a false belief that the 
recipe for enlargement, namely that 
conditionality incentives generate lasting 
reforms, can be replicated even though the 
main carrot – EU membership – was missing. 
On the other hand, one of the many sources of 
the current geopolitical competition with the 
Russian Federation might even have emerged 
as a result of the perceived similarity of certain 
underlying logics of the ENP with the 
enlargement process. Thus, if the EU is truly 
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striving to present the ENP, and the EaP in 
particular, as a non-threat, the conceptual link 
between enlargement and the ENP has to be 
addressed in the New ENP.  
 
3. Provide a road map 
The EU will invariably need to abandon the 
policy’s underlying open-endedness. Playing 
for time is no longer an option, given that the 
neighbourhood is, in fact, a ‘ring of fire’. 
Reform-willing neighbours need to be given a 
clear-cut road map. Only an end-goal will allow 
them to anticipate some light at the end of a 
rather long reform tunnel and help them justify 
vis-à-vis their own societies why costly and 
painful reforms need to be undertaken and will 
eventually pay off. Neither members of the 
Commission, the Council and the EEAS, nor 
representatives of national governments of EU 
member states have lately missed an 
opportunity to emphasize the centrality of 
Association Agreements and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) in 
the overall context of EU-neighbourhood 
relations. Yet, they have all stayed remarkably 
silent as to whether full implementation of 
these agreements is just a means to an end or 
already the end itself. 
 
4.   Apply the di f f erent iat ion pr inc ip le  to the 
‘more for  more ’  log i c  
In the context of the current revision process, 
the ‘more for more’ principle, in conjunction 
with the ‘less for less’ logic, seems to be 
gaining increasing momentum. Additionally, 
growing voices are demanding that true 
‘differentiation’ has to be put at the center of 
the re-revised ENP. Undoubtedly, this is 
sensible and overdue, although strictly 
speaking, these principles have been 
underpinning the ENP, at least conceptually, 
already since its inception and do not represent 
any new element in the design of the ENP. 
However, it is in the way that these principles 
will be applied and understood that the 
element of novelty could be introduced. The 
‘more for more’ principle might actually prove 
more effective in providing not only a tool to 
respond to changes in the neighbourhood, but 
also an instrument in the hands of the EU to 
display its ambitions and greater assertiveness. 
In other words, by giving more, under carefully 
defined and observed conditions, the EU 
might get more commitment for cooperation 
coming from its neighbours. The offer of 
‘everything but institutions’, as Romano Prodi 
remarked in 2003, and the idea to create an 
‘EU-Neighbourhood Economic Community’, 
as was discussed some years ago, thus need to 
return more saliently to the ENP’s agenda.  
 
Conversely, as far as the 'less for less' logic is 
concerned, civil society (projects) must not fall 
victim to any state of play of governmental 
cooperation between governments of ENP 
partners and the EU. Instead, negative 
conditionality should rather revolve around 
trade preferences, and their suspension. In fact, 
the EU’s neighbours are more dependent on 
preferential EU market access than vice versa 
or, as in the case of energy suppliers Algeria 
and Azerbaijan, desperately need the oil and 
gas rent for regime survival. 
 
5. Expand funct ional  governance 
cooperat ion 
The ENP has been serving as a considerably 
powerful tool to increase democracy-related 
features through the ‘back door’. Be it in the 
field of customs, aviation, the environment or 
mobility – in all these supposedly technical 
areas, functional governance cooperation 
between the EU on one hand and 
governmental partners on the other has led, in 
fact, to greater accountability, greater 
transparency and increased public participation. 
Obviously, this has not yet had a major impact 
on the nature of political systems in the 
neighbourhoods. But in conjunction with the 
expansion of such cooperation to other 
seemingly technical areas, trickle-down and 
spill-over effects are bound to also reach other 
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governance-related areas that will then 
gradually impact upon polities.  
 
EU institutions and member states’ 
governments are well advised to build upon 
this important finding. 
 
6. Maintain and strengthen further a 
pol i t i ca l  focus 
The war in Ukraine and the illegal annexation 
of Crimea by Russia has reminded policy-
makers in Brussels and EU Member States’ 
capitals of the need to ensure stability and 
security beyond the EU’s borders. While this 
may eventually stimulate further advances of 
the CFSP, it must not erode the political 
dimension of the ENP. If the EU, and with it 
the re-revised ENP, aims at being perceived by 
societies in the neighbourhood, by the 
neighbours of the neighbours, and also by the 
public in EU member states themselves as a 
credible ‘force for good’, the promotion of 
democracy, the rule of law, good governance 
and universal values and freedoms need to stay 
at the heart of any future approach towards the 
neighbourhood. 
 
7. Place  extra emphasis  on conf l i c t  
reconc i l iat ion 
The future ENP must move beyond mere 
declarations for supporting conflict resolution, 
in particular when one party to the many 
conflicts, i.e. Russia, does not show any 
meaningful political will to engage in such 
resolution efforts. Thus, the EU through the 
EaP should also pursue measures aiming at 
promoting reconciliation between the different 
communities competing for separate identities 
– in Ukraine, but also in Moldova and the 
South Caucasus. In this sense, the current 
revision process is an opportunity to bring to 
the same table a number of stakeholders and 
conflict parties, at least from within the 
neighbourhood, with a view to engage them in 
devising new channels and mechanisms for 
reconciliation at the community level. 
 
8. Place migrat ion and mobi l i ty  schemes at  
the heart  o f  the new ENP 
Mobility schemes will continue to be important 
in the new ENP, not only because talks and 
negotiations in this regard are ongoing, but 
because without them, the ‘common area of 
shared prosperity’ cannot really come into 
being. Schemes of circular migration for 
summer work could be granted to young 
students from ENP countries, in the absence 
of the possibility to grant them work visas. For 
example, the ‘Work & Travel’ program of the 
US could be replicated, and it could provide 
young people in neighbouring countries with a 
direct contact with the EU. Such a measure 
would generate powerful cultural remittances, 
the importance of which cannot be 
underestimated if the EU were to become 
more visible in the public discourse in 
neighbouring societies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Focusing once more on admittedly catchy 
phrases such as ‘more for more’ and ‘less for 
less’, and engaging in a discourse that revolves 
around the alleged need to go ‘back to basics’, 
the EU risks oversimplifying complex issues 
and overriding concrete promises in the cloudy 
skies of the broad vocabulary it has so far used 
in designing the ENP. Given that the EU’s 
Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods are 
exposed to ever-changing developments and 
are slipping from crisis to crisis, this is not the 
time to simply repackage ‘old wine in new 
bottles’ bur rather enter into a ‘back to the 
future’ mode.  
 
The EU needs to ensure that it truly upgrades 
its engagement in order to obtain more 
engagement by the neighbours – East and 
South – in return. To do that, commitment is 
crucial and bringing all 28 EU member states 
on board is key. This needs to be accompanied 
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by overcoming intra- and inter-institutional turf 
wars and by making the EU’s presence in the 
neighbourhood more visible and coordinated 
with EU member states’ representations. 
Though these are just some minimum measures, 
they would make an ultimate difference to 
enhance the EU’s credibility as a regional and 
international actor and, as a result, the 
effectiveness of the ENP’s next edition. 
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